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Abstract 
Quine is generally seen as one of the foremost empiricists of the 20th century. For large parts 
of his career, the label "empiricist" is accurate; in his mature work, however, he integrated 
decidedly anti-empiricist elements in his epistemology. From The Roots of Reference 
onwards, he enlists natural selection and innate cognitive structures to ensure that scientific 
concepts have “a degree of objective validity”. From From Stimulus to Science onwards, he 
also explains the very possibility of communication via a preestablished harmony of innate 
cognitive structures that is guaranteed by natural selection. The article reconstrues the 
reasons that compelled Quine to these commitments, and it details the development of 
Quine's thinking on these topics across more than three decades; in particular, the article 
argues that recognizing that so-called stimulus meanings are private has decisively shaped 
Quine's views. By means of a critical evaluation, the article argues that natural selection can 
make plausible that scientific concepts have a degree of objective validity – if this Quinean 
claim is properly understood; in contrast, the article suggests, with recourse to research by 
Robert C. Richardson, that it is doubtful whether natural selection can underpin the 






W.V. Quine is widely held to have been an empiricist. Often, he himself explicitly adopted 
this label. For his research until the late 1980s, this categorization is accurate, and it agrees 
with the readings of Quine’s foremost interpreters of these days, such as Gibson (1988). 
However, as I will argue in this article, in his mature philosophy, he decisively departed from 
core empiricist convictions. Analogously, Quine has defended a version of physicalism for 
some of his most productive and influential research periods, whereas his mature philosophy 
is not recognizably physicalistic anymore.1 
This article details Quine’s development away from this physicalistic empiricism, as it is 
outlined most forcefully in Word and Object, to the mature account in From Stimulus to 
Science, which is characterized by heavy use of evolutionary notions and innate cognitive 
structures. I point out that there were two main reasons that prompted this Quinean 
development, namely a basic problem in his account of linguistic meaning as well as an 
unanswered question regarding his philosophy of science: It became clear to Quine that the 
account given in Word and Object implies that competent speakers of a language are 
necessarily talking past each other – even on the level of so-called holophrastic observation 
sentences (compare Burge 2010, 224).2 Furthermore, Quine realized that what he called 
innate quality spaces in Word and Object determine the epistemic success or failure of 
science, which prompted the question why these quality spaces could provide the ground for 
what he saw as the undeniable epistemic success of science. The article concludes with a 
critical evaluation of this double use of natural selection to address both issues. 
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The article is structured as follows. In the remainder of this introductory section, I first situate 
the topic of this article in the broader context of 20th century philosophy of science. Then, I 
delineate three central concepts for Quine’s epistemology and for his theory of meaning. In 
doing so, I focus on Word and Object, but I also take later writings into account where 
appropriate. Next, in sections 2 and 3, I detail the problems that Quine recognized with this 
account from Word and Object, and I delineate the central steps that Quine took to solve these 
problems. finally, in section 4, I critically assess these solutions. 
Quine's struggle with the intersubjectivity of observation sentences belongs to a central 
debate in the philosophy of science of his century. As a consequence of several seminal 
publications after WWII, among them Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(Kuhn, 1962/1996), but also Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (Quine, 1951/1980), 
philosophers of science worried that all observation and empirical evidence in science might 
be theory-laden, with the consequence that there would be no neutral arbiter between 
competing models or theories in a scientific dispute: Each side just conceives the world 
through their respective theory-laden lens, and there cannot be any common epistemic ground 
between them. As I will show, Quine intended his conception of holophrastic observation 
sentences to address this worry. 
The first of the three central Quinean concepts to be introduced is observation sentence. 
According to Quine, the infant’s first steps into language are not the acquisition of words, but 
rather of observation sentences. In Word and Object, Quine (1960, 35–46) introduces 
observation sentences as a variant of occasion sentences. The latter “command assent or 
dissent only if queried after an appropriate prompting stimulation” (Quine 1960, 35–36). In 
this, they differ from standing sentences such as 'Physical bodies attract each other'. Occasion 
sentences are easier to learn, as a competent speaker’s assent to them depends – to a 
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considerable degree – on the respective situation. 
Furthermore, in most cases,3 an observation sentence has two substantially different modes of 
existence, or more precisely, of use. First, it can be used as a bona fide structured sentence. In 
this mode, observation sentences have a grammatical and logical structure and they carry 
ontological commitments – they are part of a theory of the world. Second, in addition to this 
conceptually structured and thus theory-laden use, observation sentences have a holophrastic, 
non-conceptual use (Quine 1992, 8). In this mode, which is the epistemically significant one, 
observation sentences are meaningful only as a whole, as if they were composed of a single 
word.4 Hence, they do not have any (proto-)logical structure, and they are not committed to 
any ontology or scientific theory; in other words, they provide theory-neutral checkpoints for 
scientific inquiry. In the following, if not specified otherwise, with ‘observation sentence’, I 
always mean their holophrastic use. For more details on this duality of observation sentences, 
compare Hylton (2007, 140–48). 
To properly appreciate what sets observation sentences apart from other occasion sentences, 
it is necessary to introduce Quine's concept of stimulus meaning. Often, the meaning of a 
word is conceived as something that is not located in spacetime. For example, the meaning of 
the word ‘horse’ could be said to denote an abstract property which is common to all horses. 
Quine never accepted such a non-physicalistic conception of meaning. Stimulus meaning is 
what Quine proposes as a physicalistic reconception of the traditional notion of meaning, as a 
replacement for it. 
Quine (1960, 32) defines the stimulus meaning of a sentence 𝑃 relative to the subject 𝑆 in the 
following way. The affirmative stimulus meaning of 𝑃 for 𝑆 is the class of all the sensory 
stimulations – across all the subject’s senses – which prompt 𝑆 to assent to 𝑃. Mutatis 
mutandis, Quine defines the negative stimulus meaning of 𝑃 for 𝑆: it is given by the class of 
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stimulations that cause 𝑆 to reject 𝑃, and the stimulus meaning of 𝑃 emerges as the ordered 
pair of the two classes.5 To illustrate this notion of stimulus meaning, consider the sentence 
“Rabbit!”. What is the stimulus meaning of this sentence for our speaker Rudolph? According 
to the definition above, it consists of the class of the stimulations which would cause Rudolph 
to affirm the sentence together with the class of stimulations which would cause him to deny 
it.6 
Quine (1960, 44–45) introduces the notion of observationality to set the stimulus meaning of 
observation sentences apart from the stimulus meaning of other sentences. A sentence is low 
on observationality if the intersubjective variability of its stimulus meaning is high. Consider 
the following two examples. On the one hand, the observationality of “A bachelor!” is 
supposedly very low, as your inclination to assent to it simply depends on whether you know 
the person in question or not – and not on some observable feature of the respective scene 
(putting aside things like wedding rings, or their absence). Thus, the stimulus meaning of “A 
bachelor!” differs among people according to their different social relationships. On the other 
hand, the observationality of “Red!” is very high, since the stimulus meaning of it is quite 
uniform among competent English speakers: according to Word and Object, we are all 
prepared to agree to this latter sentence if, and only if, our retina is stimulated at a certain 
wavelength. Generally speaking, the stimulus meaning of a given observation sentence is 
intersubjectively (almost) invariant. 
Since observation sentences, taken holophrastically, are directly associated with an 
intersubjectively invariant stimulus meaning, to judge whether a given observation sentence 
is true in a given situation does not presuppose any linguistic knowledge. Therefore, the 
infant has something that she shares with her parent before she can rely on a shared language, 
and which ipso facto can serve as the gateway to language. Furthermore, thanks to the 
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intersubjective invariability and theory-freedom of the stimulus meanings of observation 
sentences, even proponents of radically different theories will affirm these observation 
sentences in the same situations, that is, when stimulated similarly in the relevant respect. 
Thus, holophrastic observation sentences can provide theory-neutral checkpoints for 
scientific theorizing. 
However, even if we grant that observation sentences, used holophrastically, do not 
presuppose linguistic knowledge, or a theory of the world, this does not adequately explain 
how they can function as the gateway to language. Regarding the sheer multiplicity of causal 
patterns of sensory stimulations which accompany any of the parent’s utterings of “Red!” – 
sounds, smells, visual patterns, etc. – it is highly unlikely that the child is able to identify the 
important aspect of this torrential input, namely the presence of a red surface, of this 
torrential input. Quine addresses this problem with his concept of innate quality spaces 
(which he later calls 'innate senses of similarity' and finally 'innate similarity standards'). To 
acquire her first observation sentences, Quine holds, the child must be inclined to give more 
weight to the relevant similarities than to the irrelevant ones – where the relevant similarities 
are those which matter for the meanings of the observation sentences that the infant tries to 
learn.7 
According to Quine (1960, 83), the child is biased to generalize along the aspects of the 
stimuli which matter for her parent, namely the red patch in the visual field, as opposed to, 
say, a gust of wind. The reason for this bias is that the infant’s quality spaces situate global 
stimuli involving red close together, instead of grouping all those global stimuli where a 
certain distinctive gust of wind is present. This way, the child is able to inductively generalize 
the stimulus meanings of her first observation sentences. If we remember that the stimulus 
meanings of observation sentences are uniform among the community of competent speakers, 
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it follows that, by having thus learned these observation sentences, the child has learned the 
meaning of her first words8 - a meaning, notably, that she shares with her parent. 
Using the behaviorist vocabulary that Quine held in high esteem at the time of Word and 
Object, this yields a rather neat and physicalistic picture of how the infant makes her first 
steps into language: having uttered at random something along the lines of “Red!” in the 
presence of a red surface, the parent rewards the infant. As the infant likes being rewarded, 
she repeats the same sound on occasions when it is stimulated in a similar way, which means 
that it has started using the observation sentence “Red!” correctly. Since the possible respects 
in which another stimulation could be similar to the relevant one are legion, the child needs a 
quality space that is both biased towards the relevant similarities and similar to the one of her 
parent. Thanks to this quality space, the infant can associate the correct stimulus meaning 
with “Red!”, a stimulus meaning which is intersubjectively (almost) invariant. In the same 
way, Quine ensures that two scientists proposing different theories do share a minimal 
common ground to decide which theory is empirically superior: their theoretical differences 
notwithstanding, both associate the same stimulus meaning with the same holophrastic 
observation sentences. 
2. Two Challenges for This Quinean Account 
The first challenge for this Quinean account of how language connects us to the world and to 
our fellow human beings stems from the function that the quality spaces play in this account. 
If these quality spaces determine the fundamental touchstones for scientific theorizing, then 
the epistemic success of scientific theorizing is closely tied to the epistemic standing of these 
quality spaces. In other words: unless these quality spaces are such that they give us a good 
basis for scientific theorizing, it is very hard to see how the scientific enterprise could ever 
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bear any epistemic fruit, given the fundamental role played by these quality spaces. Quine 
nowhere mentions this epistemic significance of quality spaces in Word and Object, but he 
discusses it in Natural Kinds as well as in The Roots of Reference – with strongly differing 
conclusions. Quine (1974, 19) came to conceive this issue as the question regarding the 
objective validity of scientific theories. 
The second problem with this picture is, to put it simply, that stimulus meanings are private 
(in the sense that they cannot be shared by different speakers). The first article in which 
Quine explicitly acknowledges the fact that global stimuli are private – and recognizes its 
relevance for his theory of meaning and evidence – is Propositional Objects. Quine (1969a, 
viii) writes that he held Propositional Objects as a lecture in 1965. Thus, the following 
remarkable passage probably dates from no more than five years after the publication of Word 
and Object: 
It seems vital that in correlating one subject’s verbal behavior with another’s, for 
instance as a basis for translating one language into another, we be able to equate one 
subject’s stimulation to another’s. Yet how are we to do so? If we construe stimulation 
patterns my way, we cannot equate them without supposing homology of receptors; 
and this is absurd, not only because full homology is implausible, but because it 
surely ought not to matter. (Quine 1969c, 157) 
Here, Quine explicitly acknowledges that his notion of stimulus meaning and thus of 
communication in general depends on homology of sensory receptors, which is implausible.9 
Why is this the case? 
Homology of sensory receptors, which is a condition for the possibility of intersubjectively 
shared stimulus meaning, is not required when the focus is restricted to one single subject. 
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When asked for a verdict on an observation sentence in two different situations, a competent 
speaker behaves similarly when stimulated in a similar way: she assents to it when confronted 
with a stimulation which falls in the range of the sentence’s affirmative stimulus meaning, 
and she dissents when the stimulation belongs to the sentence’s negative stimulus meaning. 
However, pace the claim of Word and Object, these stimulus meanings are private. This 
means that two witnesses of the same scenario who agree on the truth of an observation 
sentence cannot be said to witness the same situation sensu stricto, that is, they cannot be said 
to be stimulated alike. In Propositional Objects, Quine first states that, in the context of first-
language acquisition, sensory surfaces are the best “boundaries” to define input, but that 
“when we come to the seemingly essential business of saying what it is for two people to be 
stimulated alike, we tangle with the myth of homologous nerve endings” (Quine 1969c, 158). 
Quine here wrestles with the following issue: if, as a consequence of non-homologous nerve 
endings, the parent’s global stimulus differs from the child’s in any given situation (even if 
the child could take the very same physical position as her parent), then it is misguided to 
explain the success of the child’s inductions by means of a quality space which situates global 
stimuli. No matter how biased her quality space, the child can never hope to infer a stimulus 
meaning which is substantially like the parent’s because no two speakers associate even 
approximately similar stimuli with a given observation sentence. In other words, even if there 
was a remarkable similarity between the quality spaces of the parent and the infant, it would 
still be useless because there are no similar global stimuli to situate in these spaces (compare 
Quine 1969c, 158). Hence, the privacy of stimulus meanings undermines the intersubjectivity 
of Quine's conception of linguistic meanings – even on the level of holophrastic observation 
sentences. 
A simple way to bypass this problem is unavailable to Quine. One could simply accept that 
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global proximal stimuli are private but assume the distal stimuli (the intersubjectively 
invariant objects that cause the proximal stimulations) to be relevant for the purposes of 
naturalized epistemology. Quine (1992, 41) rejects this solution because he is “interested in 
the flow of evidence from the triggering of the senses to the pronouncements of science”. 
Assuming that infants can refer to objects, if only perceptually, before they even learn their 
first observation sentence would omit the part of naturalized epistemology in which Quine is 
highly interested: how did humans develop this ability to refer to objects? It therefore runs 
counter to the very goal of Quine’s project to assume the distal stimulus as basic for first-
language acquisition. 
In effect, at the end of Propositional Objects, Quine admits that he has no solution to this 
problem. Regarding the homology problem, he remarks: “I leave you, therefore, with a 
problem of theoretical formulation that carries no practical problem with it” (Quine 1969c, 
159–60). However, as I hope to show in the following, Quine was far from simply leaving 
this problem to his readers. On the very contrary: he grappled with it for the rest of his 
publishing career. 
3. Quine’s Struggle to Explain Objectivity and Intersubjectivity 
In this section, I trace Quine’s attempts, extending over more than three decades, to solve a 
problem that he recognized around 1965: his conception of intersubjectively (almost) 
invariant stimulus meaning is based on a factually wrong presupposition, namely on 
homology of nerve endings. Furthermore, I delineate the evolution of Quine’s answer to 
another question: Why is our science so predictively successful? Since science is 
epistemically based on observation sentences, and since these observation sentences are in 
turn shaped by our innate quality space, an answer to this question must involve attributing 
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some sort of epistemic validity to these quality spaces. 
In the following sections, I show how Quine tried to come to terms with these issues in The 
Roots of Reference (section 3.2) and From Stimulus to Science (section 3.3). This will show 
that Quine’s final proposal to address the two issues is neither recognizably physicalistic, nor 
empiricist anymore. Before doing that, I discuss Quine’s rather surprising position in Natural 
Kinds (section 3.1). 
3.1. Natural Kinds: Natural Selection Endows Humans 
Doubly 
Here is how Quine conceives the central function of quality spaces and their inhabitants in 
Natural Kinds: “The uniformity of people’s quality spaces virtually assures that similar 
presentations will elicit similar verdicts [emphasis RG]” (Quine 1969b, 125). When 
compared to Word and Object, this passage conceives of the function of quality spaces in the 
same way: to guarantee that different humans assent to observation sentences in roughly the 
same situations. However, in contrast to Word and Object, the inhabitants of quality spaces 
are now vaguely referred to as ‘presentations’. 
In light of the privacy of stimulus meanings, it is clear why Quine uses ‘presentations’ instead 
of ‘stimulations’: for the reasons presented above (section 2), a quality space that allocates 
inevitably different stimulations and hence stimulus meanings cannot ensure intersubjectivity 
of meaning, no matter how uniform the space itself is. If global stimuli are necessarily 
different from speaker to speaker, then stimulus meanings, being a part of global stimuli, are 
necessarily different too, no matter how uniform the respective similarity spaces are. As it 
were, if you take an apple and an orange and put them into two identical storage systems, the 
two fruits are still not identical, not shared across the two storage systems. This impasse 
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notwithstanding, there are still passages in Natural Kinds where Quine (1969b, 123) refers to 
an “innate spacing of stimulations” which is at work in first-language acquisition. I submit 
that this ambiguity in use is indicative of a transitory phase in Quine’s theory. 
Furthermore, in "Natural Kinds" Quine judges the epistemic validity of innate quality spaces 
very negatively. This innate sense of similarity is based on colors and thus proves very useful 
“at the food-gathering level” (Quine 1969b, 127). It is also this innate sense of similarity 
which is vital for first-language acquisition. Unfortunately, “color is king in our innate quality 
space, but undistinguished in the cosmic circles” (Quine 1969b, 127). In other words, our 
innate sense of similarity is useful to survive, but not of much use in understanding the laws 
behind the experiences; it is a bad guide to the “functionally relevant groupings in nature” 
(Quine 1969b, 126). This, however, is not the end of the story, as natural selection has been 
particularly generous towards human beings: 
Evidently natural selection has dealt with the conflict by endowing man doubly: with 
both a color slanted quality space and the ingenuity to rise above it. (Quine 1969b, 
128) 
Here, Quine proposes the following model to explain the capacities of human beings to both 
succeed on the “food-gathering level” (Quine 1969b, 127), that is, in their daily affairs, and in 
theoretical science. When it comes to the former, we are well-off with our inborn quality 
space. When it comes to exploring the “workings of the cosmic machine revealed by science” 
(Quine 1969b, 133), however, we are able to transcend this inborn quality space and adopt a 
spacing of qualities which is fit for theoretical science.10 
These are Quine’s first attempts to address a rather straightforward question suggested by his 
notion of empirical justification. The quality spaces determine the meaning of observation 
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sentences, which in turn serve as checkpoints for scientific theorizing. Hence, the question 
arises: are these innate quality spaces good guidelines for scientific theorizing? The answer 
that Quine gives in Natural Kinds is: no, they are not. Therefore, he proposes that scientists 
must be able to transcend this irrational spacing to properly engage in science. Put differently, 
according to the answer given in Natural Kinds, the success of science is made possible by 
our ability to rid ourselves of the animal sense of similarity and to develop the cognitive 
structures needed to pursue theoretical science; in Quine's words: to move on from “unreason 
into science” (Quine 1969b, 138). 
To sum up, in "Natural Kinds", Quine (1969b) substantially revises the notion of quality 
space, or sense of similarity, when compared to Word and Object. He introduces the notion of 
theoretical similarity to explain why our science is successful despite the “brute irrationality 
of our [innate, RG] sense of similarity” (Quine 1969b, 125). Furthermore, he does not employ 
the notion of stimulus meaning, which was central to his doctrine of meaning and evidence in 
Word and Object. Similarly, he often uses the vague notion of presentations when saying 
what this sense of similarity operates on. Probably, Quine, who is otherwise deeply 
committed to clarity, uses this vague term because it allows him to avoid answering a 
question which is unclear to him at the time of Natural Kinds: what are the inhabitants of 
innate quality spaces? They cannot accommodate physical objects because this would betray 
his entire naturalized epistemology; neither can they accommodate patterns of stimulations, 
as they differ too much among humans to serve Quine’s purposes. 
3.2. The Roots of Reference: Natural Selection Ensures “A 
Degree of Objective Validity” 
In this section, I argue that the innovation that Quine was still missing in Natural Kinds is 
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introduced with the notion of perceptual similarity standards in The Roots of Reference. In 
this work, Quine dedicates the entire first chapter to a thorough analysis of the concepts of 
perception and of perceptual similarity. 
Quine’s introduction of the notion of perceptual similarity marks a deliberate departure from 
the notion of similar stimulus meaning, which dominated in Word and Object. Consider the 
following passage, where Quine reflects on the kinds of similarity which can be applied to the 
episodes of a subject’s life (an episode of a subject’s life is roughly the entire material 
constitution of an individual human at a given point in time): 
Episodes in the subject’s life ought, one feels, to admit of three sorts of similarity. 
There is receptual similarity, having to do only with sensory input. There is behavioral 
similarity, at the other extreme, which relates episodes according to the output of 
overt behavior at those times, regardless of causal factors. [...] Perceptual similarity, 
finally, should be somehow intermediate between receptual and behavioral similarity. 
It should be reflected in the behavioral output of the episode rather than just current 
input, but it should be reflected in only so much of the behavioral output as is 
somehow distinctive to the current input [emphasis RG]. (Quine 1974, 21) 
According to this passage, receptual similarity is located on the level of stimulus meaning: it 
is a purely physiological measure of the sensory activity on a subject’s nerve endings. 
Obviously, we can speak of similar stimulus meanings in the sense of receptual similarity: 
two stimulus meanings are more or less similar to each other depending on how similar the 
respective global stimuli are to each other – and the similarity of global stimuli is clearly a 
matter of input (in the sense of impacts of particles on sensory surfaces). 
Behavioral similarity operates on a different level, to wit, on the level of the reaction of the 
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subject to the stimulations. Two stimulations are judged more or less similar for a subject in 
this behavioral sense depending on the reaction of the subject – regardless what patterns 
irradiate his or her nerve endings. Quine (1974, 21) proposes an austerely physiological 
measure for behavioral similarity: “the total set of fibres of striped muscle that are contracted 
or released on one occasion and on another”. 
Quine then introduces his third kind of similarity, namely perceptual similarity. Perceptual 
similarity is intermediate between receptual and behavioral similarity insofar as it is (1) 
observable in the subject’s behavior and (2) relates this behavior to aspects of receptual input. 
As I will detail in the following paragraphs, Quine tries to deal with the first requirement by 
conceiving of perceptual similarity as a second-order disposition to behavior. The second 
requirement is fulfilled by perceptual similarity’s being a disposition to acquire dispositions 
to act in a certain way in response to certain patterns of sensory stimulations. 
Quine (1974, 8–12) conceives of dispositions as a kind of scaffold for the progress of science: 
by means of dispositions, we can earmark effects that we suspect have a common mechanism 
as their cause, without yet knowing the respective mechanism. Thus, to conceive of 
perceptual similarity as a kind of disposition means that we earmark a class of phenomena 
that we suspect are the characteristic effects of a yet unknown physical mechanism (or 
several such mechanisms). 
The characteristic effect of perceptual similarity, conceived as a second-order disposition, is 
that it causes and structures first-order dispositions. To return once again to the example of 
the parent, the child, and the parent’s uttering “Red!”, perceptual similarity enables the child 
to acquire the disposition to respond with “Red!” whenever it perceives a red surface. The 
child acquires this latter disposition because it is born with the second-order disposition to 
acquire first-order dispositions that closely resemble those of the parent. 
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Note that Quine no more holds that similarity standards operate on global stimuli of the 
subject’s sensory surfaces, but rather on “brief stages or temporal segments of the perceiving 
subject’s body” (Quine 1974, 16). Obviously, this includes not only the irradiations of the 
subject’s sensory surfaces, but also neural signals conveyed to his brain originating from his 
stomach, say, after a good meal. Hence, a given subject could be too sleepy to respond to a 
given stimulus in the way it has been conditioned to. According to Quine (1974, 22), this 
“ceteris paribus” effect is characteristic of dispositions. However, according to Quine, natural 
selection keeps such ceteris paribus effects under control in the case of perceptual similarity . 
After all, if we generally did not follow our "primitive inductions" (ibd.) acquired based on 
perceptual similarity (if we, for instance, do not run away from an approaching lion upon 
seeing it, but decide instead to give our stomach the desired rest), we would be in serious 
trouble. 
Apart from keeping the ceteris paribus effect at bay, natural selection is also helpful in 
assuring that our innate sense of perceptual similarity runs “with the grain of nature”: 
After all, man’s inductive expectations are reached by extrapolating along lines of 
perceptual similarity: experiences that begin similarly are expected to turn out in 
similar ways. Our innate standards of perceptual similarity show a gratifying tendency 
to run with the grain of nature. This concurrence is accountable, surely, to natural 
selection. Since good prediction has survival value, natural selection will have 
fostered perceptual similarity standards in us and in other animals that tend 
accordingly. (Quine 1974, 19) 
After the negative assessment of our innate similarity standards in Natural Kinds – Quine 
wrote of the “brute irrationality of our sense of similarity” (Quine 1969b, 125) – it is 
surprising how respectfully Quine treats these same standards in The Roots of Reference. He 
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still believes that our innate sense of similarity changes over time, but it is obvious that he has 
abandoned the strict distinction between a subjective, animal sense which is innate, and a 
much more objective, theoretical sense which is required for scientific theorizing. 
Furthermore, Quine holds that, since the innate standard of similarity is hereditary, “we can 
count on considerable social uniformity in perceptual similarity standards” (Quine 1974, 23). 
This means that it is rational to assume that human beings have very similar innate perceptual 
similarity standards. 
It is remarkable how vaguely Quine expresses himself regarding the epistemic capacity of our 
innate perceptual similarity standards. In the passage quoted, Quine writes that they “run with 
the grain of nature” – without ever specifying how to read this metaphor. Similarly, 
immediately before this passage, Quine writes that the standards have “a degree of objective 
validity” (Quine 1974, 19), again without explaining this claim. Given Quine’s usual clarity 
and explicitness, this should raise eyebrows. The explanation for this vagueness that I favor is 
that Quine is no scientific realist in the contemporary sense of the term; hence, he would not 
use a clearly realist terminology. Still, he thought that natural selection does give some 
epistemic validity to these evolved standards. Therefore, he uses a phrasing that gestures at 
such epistemic validity without committing him to anything like scientific realism (I discuss 
Quine’s rejection of scientific realism below, section 4.1). 
To conclude this discussion, it is necessary to point out that, strictly speaking, it is not 
perceptual similarity, but an observation sentence’s similarity basis which replaces the (now 
untenable) notion of intersubjectively almost invariant stimulus meaning. The similarity basis 
of an observation sentence is “the distinctive trait shared by the episodes appropriate to that 
observation sentence; the shared trait in which their perceptual similarity consists” (Quine 
1974, 43). Quine here explains that the similarity basis of an observation sentence is the small 
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part common to all the various sensory episodes in which it is correct to utter a given 
observation sentence. Quine calls this part the shared trait of these episodes. Note that the 
similarity involved in defining similarity bases is not receptual, but perceptual. Hence, the 
relevant episodes can be very dissimilar on the receptual level, as long as they are 
perceptually similar. Accordingly, Quine uses clearly phenomenological language to illustrate 
his conception of trait: he writes that in the case of “Red!” the child has to learn that it is a 
matter of color, not of shape, of how big a patch counts as red, etc.11 
Thus, unlike reception, which is “flagrantly physical”, perception has “mentalistic 
overtones”, but fortunately, it is “accessible to behavioral criteria” (Quine 1974, 4). Even 
though perceptual similarity still operates on physically describable events in a subject’s 
body, there is, as it were, more to perception than meets the receptors. Quine therefore 
proposes a behavioral test to delineate a subject’s sense of perceptual similarity: 
Now we can correct our formulation of the behavioral condition for perceptual 
similarity, to read thus: 𝑎 is shown to be perceptually more similar to 𝑏 than to 𝑐 when 
the subject has been conditioned to respond in some fashion to all episodes in the 
receptual neighborhood of 𝑏, and to withhold that response from all those in the 
receptual neighborhood of 𝑐, and is then found to so respond to those in the 
neighborhood of 𝑎. (Quine 1974, 17–18) 
According to this passage, a subject’s perceptual similarity standards can be measured as 
follows.12 We condition the subject to respond in a certain way to a certain stimulus. 
Furthermore, we condition the subject not to respond thus to another stimulus. Then, we can 
test whether a third stimulus is perceptually more like the first than the second for the subject 
by stimulating the subject in the third way and observing whether the subject does or does not 
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react in the manner in which the subject has been conditioned to react to the first stimulus. 
Still, Quine’s notion of perceptual similarity is not in the same sense physical as his notion of 
stimulus meaning. While, in the case of stimulus meaning, Quine could actually say what the 
physical structures and mechanisms consist in, perceptual similarity is rather an “earmark” 
(Quine 1974, 11). It refers to a class of phenomena that we suspect are the effects of a 
physical mechanism, or of several such physical mechanisms. 
Despite this introduction and detailed discussion of perceptual similarity, Quine expresses a 
residual unease about the privacy of stimulus meanings in The Roots of Reference. In §10, 
Quine (1974, 39) defines observation sentences as those sentences on whose truth values, in 
any given situation, all competent speakers that witness the situation would agree (see also 
Quine 1969,  86). Hence, Quine has completely abandoned any recourse to stimulations in 
this definition of observation sentence. However, consider how he reflects on this definition: 
The definition does raise a subtler problem, however – a problem that was already 
noted in another connection in §6. The definition speaks of joint witnessing. In a more 
precise statement, it would speak of witnesses subject to receptually similar 
impingements; and thus it would raise again the homology question that we noted at 
the end of §6. 
Still, the definition is as sharp as the notion of witness and linguistic community on 
which it depends. It is good [sic] as behavioral concepts go. (Quine 1974, 41) 
As Quine rightly points out in this passage, joint witnessing, a notion which he needs to 
define observation sentences, requires that witnesses can be similarly stimulated and hence 
provokes again the homology problem. Hence, at the end of the discussion in The Roots of 
Reference, Quine admits that he has not solved the basic problem caused by the fact that 
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stimulus meaning is private (his gesture at the intrinsic limitations of behavioral concepts is 
inconclusive; Quine himself was not satisfied with this response to the issue and continued to 
belabor it). 
 
3.3. From Stimulus to Science: Natural Selection Ensures A 
Preestablished Harmony of Similarity Standards 
In his last monograph, From Stimulus to Science, published 1995, Quine presents an account 
of the infant’s first steps into language where innate standards of perceptual similarity take 
center stage (which was not the case with Pursuit of Truth, Quine, 1992).13 Furthermore, 
Quine assigns evolutionary considerations a central role in his attempt to explain how 
communication is possible. Genuine communication requires that the recipient of a certain 
message can in principle understand what the sender of the message means by the message. 
With intersubjectively shared stimulus meanings, Quine could account for this requirement in 
the case of observation sentences. With private stimulus meanings, Quine is committed to the 
view that speakers are necessarily talking past each other even in the case of holophrastic 
observation sentences, as no two speakers could possibly mean the same thing with any given 
observation sentence (remember that Quine intended stimulus meaning as a replacement for 
traditional mentalistic meaning). 
Because standards of perceptual similarity are required for first-language acquisition, indeed, 
for all learning, we are born with a provisional standard of perceptual similarity. After 
enlisting natural selection for a first time to ensure that our innate standards “mesh pretty well 
with natural trends”, Quine (1995, 20) rephrases the puzzle of shared circumstances and 
sketches the requirements for a solution:14 
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There is a puzzle here. Global stimuli are private: each is a temporally ordered set of 
some one individual’s receptors. Their perceptual similarity, in part innate and in part 
molded by experience, is private as well. Whence then this coordination of behavior 
across the tribe? It requires that if two individuals jointly witness one scene, and 
subsequently jointly witness another scene, and the one witness’s global stimulations 
on the two occasions qualify for him as perceptually similar, usually the other 
witness’s stimulations will also so qualify for the other witness. (Quine 1995, 20) 
In this passage, Quine first reaffirms the presuppositions of the puzzle. In contrast to the 
account given in Word and Object, global stimuli are private, and so is perceptual similarity. 
The problem emerges if these private entities should function as the building blocks of 
something decidedly public, namely of language. If we experience situations differently, and 
if we find different experiences similar, it seems impossible to explain how we have managed 
to develop a common language, and it seems deeply mysterious that we should even agree on 
what to say regarding a specific situation. Furthermore, Quine gives a very succinct wording 
of what is required to dispense with this mystery. If two speakers of a language witness two 
scenes, they must unanimously perceive the respective global stimuli as similar or not. 
In accordance with his overall naturalized epistemology, Quine makes global stimuli, and not 
situations, the objects of comparisons. The requirement, however, irreducibly involves these 
shared situations: the two speakers must agree on their verdict regarding global stimuli of two 
situations or scenes. Thereby, the main challenge is that these two situations give rise to four 
different global stimuli – one global stimulus for each speaker in each situation. Therefore, in 
each of the two situations, speaker 𝐴 must consider two global stimuli as similar (or 
dissimilar) which differ from the stimuli that speaker 𝐵 must judge as similar (or dissimilar). 
The challenge therefore is not simply to explain why speakers find the same situations 
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perceptually similar, but rather why they find the incongruent respective global stimuli that 
arise from these situations perceptually similar. Strictly speaking, the scenes for the two 
speakers are never the same, since they always experience different global stimuli. 
A first step to solving this puzzle has already been taken in The Roots of Reference: Quine 
proposes to focus on perception, as opposed to reception (compare above, p. 14). Quine’s 
conception of perception allows for perceptual similarity in spite of receptual dissimilarity. 
There is no principled reason why two subjects should not find receptually dissimilar 
situations perceptually similar. The crucial question therefore is: why should these innate 
perceptual similarity standards be so constituted that the speakers will, in spite of receptually 
dissimilar global stimuli, perceive the same situations as similar? Quine adresses this 
question in the following passage: 
So we see a preestablished harmony of perceptual similarity standards. If two scenes 
trigger perceptually similar global stimuli in one witness, they are apt to do likewise 
in another. 
This public harmony of private standards of perceptual similarity is accounted for by 
natural selection. The individual’s initial standards of perceptual similarity are 
inculcated, we saw, by natural selection, and so, thanks to shared ancestry and shared 
environment, will tend to harmonize across the tribe. The changes in standards 
subsequent to birth will also tend to harmonize, because of the shared society and 
environment. (Quine 1995, 21) 
According to this passage, there is a preestablished harmony of perceptual similarity 
standards among human beings.15 This preestablished harmony ensures that, if two scenes 
cause perceptually similar global stimuli in one human, they typically also cause perceptually 
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similar global stimuli in any other human. 
Furthermore, Quine claims that this preestablished harmony can be explained by natural 
selection, as far as the innate perceptual similarity standards are concerned. These standards 
stand in a preestablished harmony with our fellow human beings’ because they are genetic 
traits, which are inherited from our common ancestors, and which have developed in a shared 
environment. 
Finally, these parts of the standards that are not innate are uniform among a speech 
community because of “shared society and environment”. This means that they are uniform 
because we live in the same society and in the same environment. 
Quine cherishes the preestablished harmony of innate perceptual similarity standards because 
he thinks it allows him to explain how real communication is possible despite the privacy of 
stimulus meanings and without presupposing any pre-linguistic perception as of physical 
objects. By `real' or `genuine' communication, I mean communication where the meanings of 
some basic linguistic structures, namely holophrastic observation sentences, are shared 
among speakers.16 
According to this account, first-language acquisition works in spite, and not because of the 
patterns of sensory stimulations that affect both the infant and the parent. As shown above, 
for Quine, the infant and the parent do not witness the same situation; rather, they are 
experiencing different global stimuli in the same situation (the sameness of the situation 
being irrelevant for Quine’s accounts of meaning and evidence). This means that the Quinean 
subject, while not being causally entirely windowless, like the Leibnizian monad, is still 
experiencing sensory stimulation as something that separates her from, rather than connects 
her to, her fellow humans.17  
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This implies nothing less than that Quine has decisively rejected core elements of his 
empiricism as well as his physicalism: the empirical data, which Quine conceives as physical 
sensory stimulations, are not something that connect us to the world and to our fellow 
humans, but rather as something that separates us from both and that has to be overcome with 
innate, biologically understood cognitive capacities. This amounts to a rejection of core 
elements of Quine's empiricism because these cognitive capacities, and not empirical data of 
some sort, are now the crucial element of Quine's explanation of communication and of his 
theory of empirical evidence. It amounts to a rejection of physicalism because Quine's 
explanation is squarely based in the biological realm, with no indication how it could be 
(ontologically or semantically) reduced to physics.18 
4. Critical Assessment of Quine’s Mature Theory of Meaning and 
Evidence 
In this section, I critically assess Quine’s mature view that natural selection furnishes a 
degree of objective validity to the similarity standards of humans; then, I question Quine’s 
use of natural selection to explain the very possibility of genuine communication. 
4.1. Can Natural Selection Ensure “A Degree of Objective 
Validity”? 
We have seen that, in his Natural Kinds, Quine toyed with the idea that cognitive capacities 
that are the product of natural selection are irrational and useless for science. Later on, 
however, he credited these same products with the ability to achieve a degree of objective 
validity. We still find these two positions in contemporary debates. The view of naturally 
selected abilities as irrational is basically the line of reasoning developed by Alvin Plantinga 
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in The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. In short, Plantinga (2002) argues that if 
our cognitive faculties are the product of evolution by natural selection, it is probable that 
naturalism is false, as evolution does not select for truth-conducive abilities, but only for 
abilities which foster survival. Since the latter are distinct from the former, Darwinists must 
conclude that, while their Darwinism may help them survive, it has nothing to do with truth. 
In contrast, Hilary Kornblith explicitly argues for a continuity between the kind of reasoning 
that fosters survival and the kind of reasoning that is at work in successful scientific theories 
(Kornblith 1993, 61ff., and Kornblith 2014, 132). Furthermore, Kornblith (2014, 126) makes 
clear that he commits himself to the claim that “natural selection is selecting for knowledge-
acquiring capacities – that is, processes of belief acquisition that tend to produce truths”. In 
contrast to both positions, Maddy (2017, 219) and Burge (2010, 308) basically hold that some 
mental ability’s being the product of natural selection has no implications regarding the 
ability’s capacity to, as it were, deliver truths about the world. 
For present purposes, however, I think it more important to point out that whether we buy 
into Quine’s claim regarding the degree of objective validity depends centrally on how such 
objective validity is conceived. If it is understood in the sense of contemporary scientific 
realism, as correctly representing mind- and theory-independent reality,19 then Quine does 
face the debate sketched above. 
However, I think it misguided to read Quine as a contemporary scientific realist; instead, it 
seems more convincing to conceive his ‘robust realism’ as a position sui generis. To see why, 
consider the following passage: 
But I also expressed, at the beginning, my unswerving belief in external things – 
people, nerve endings, sticks, stones. This I reaffirm. I believe also, if less firmly, in 
atoms and electrons and in classes. Now how is all this robust realism to be reconciled 
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with the barren scene that I have just been depicting? The answer is naturalism: the 
recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that 
reality is to be identified and described. 
The semantical considerations that seemed to undermine all this were concerned not 
with assessing reality but with analyzing method and evidence. They belong not to 
ontology but to the methodology of ontology, and thus to epistemology. Those 
considerations showed that I could indeed turn my back on my external things and 
classes and ride the proxy functions to something strange and different without doing 
violence to any evidence [emphasis RG]. But all ascription of reality must come rather 
from within one’s theory of the world; it is incoherent otherwise. (Quine 1981, 21) 
In this important passage, Quine first specifies what he means by ‘robust realism’. Quine 
writes that he unswervingly believes in external things, notwithstanding his insistence that all 
these external things are theoretical posits that we could replace by “something strange and 
different” through a proxy function. It is essential to Quine’s robust realism that it 
incorporates this insight. Such a position is inconsistent with contemporary scientific realism. 
Scientific realists are precisely contesting that kinds such as atoms or electrons are real only 
in the sense that they are posited by a predictively highly successful theory: they insist that 
they are part of the furniture of the world, conceived mind- and theory-independently, in 
addition to being part of our theories. Quine’s robust realism is restricted to the first 
assertion. This reading of Quine’s realism is congenial to Ben-Menahem (2016), who urges 
that Quine, like James, rejected the very possibility of comparing our categories with the 
world's very own joints. 
Furthermore, Quine emphasizes that this combination of belief in external things with belief 
that our evidence does not determine that there are material objects rather than quadruples of 
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numbers is underwritten by his naturalism. This naturalism is based on the insight that reality 
must be described from within science, and not in some ‘prior philosophy’, a term that Quine 
uses interchangeably with ‘first philosophy’. Hence, for Quine, it is a consequence of the 
rejection of first philosophy that realism cannot amount to more than the robust or immanent 
realism that he has just introduced: unless we have a kind of access to reality that is 
qualitatively different from the one provided by empirical science, we cannot discern whether 
the posits of our most successful theories are real in a sense other than being such posits. 
Epistemically speaking, there is no other way to justify a posit than the empirical-scientific 
way. If this way leads to the insight that other posits would be just as justified, as Quine 
thinks is the case, we have to acknowledge this, but we are not committed to reject the posits 
that were used to arrive at this insight. 
Caruso (2007) also examines the relationship between Quine’s robust realism and scientific 
realism and reaches a position that is congenial to mine. Caruso (2007, 80) maintains that 
Quine’s realism requires “taking one’s conceptual scheme seriously and owning the beliefs of 
the moment”, while insisting that the reality posited by the scheme is “constituted by our 
imposition of concepts, theories, and language”. Furthermore, this reading of Quine’s realism 
agrees with Keskinen (2012, 144) in its rejection of conceiving Quine as a scientific realist: 
“with regard to the reality of objects in some further sense than being posits of our science, 
Quine’s epistemology does not entail anything [...]”. 
This implies that Quine’s assertion that our innate sense of similarity has “a degree of 
objective validity” should not be read as: correctly prefigures mind-and theory-independent 
reality. Rather, it expresses the claim that this sense has some epistemic validity and hence 
some rationality – if only of an instrumental sort. Still, it strongly contrasts with the view 
taken in Natural Kinds, which asserted the brute irrationality of this sense. 
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It is no chance that the one article where Quine comes closest to embrace a fully-fledged 
scientific realism is also the one article where he proposes that we have to transcend our 
innate sense of similarity to properly engage in science. The higher your conception of the 
epistemic power of science, the more difficult it will be for you to explain humans’ ability to 
pursue such science with recourse to natural selection. 
However, by means of conclusion, I submit that Quine’s position on the issue is largely 
consistent and convincing. Across his publications from Word and Object onwards, Quine 
has, with very few exceptions such as Natural Kinds, embraced an instrumental conception of 
scientific success: science is successful insofar as it helps us predict future phenomena, which 
is of obvious survival value, and hence increases humans’ reproductive fitness. This suggests 
that if Quine claims that our innate sense of similarity, and hence the science that is based on 
it, has a degree of objective validity, this means little more than that it is a good, and hence 
instrumentally rational means to cognitively cope with our environment; and to say that 
natural selection favors capacities that help to cope with the environment is almost 
tautologous. 
4.2. Can Natural Selection Guarantee the Preestablished 
Harmony? 
The second use to which Quine puts natural selection is to ensure that there exists a 
preestablished harmony of innate perceptual similarity standards such that two humans 
typically perceive the same situations similarly despite their being stimulated very differently. 
At first sight, this appears to be an analogous claim to the one examined above regarding 
objective validity: It seems clear that it is of survival value if two people can successfully 
communicate about events in their environment.  
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However, the situation here is substantially more complex. Rather than merely reaffirming 
that natural selection selects for capacities that help us to successfully cope with our 
environment, Quine here enlists natural selection to solve a very specific problem in his 
elaborate account of communication. Regarding the solution to this problem, it is crucial to 
distinguish between some feature’s being plausibly the result of a process of random variation 
and natural selection (because the feature is prima facie conducive to fitness) and there being 
a fully-fledged, evolutionary-biological account of how that same feature has resulted from 
this process. 
It would certainly be unfair to ask Quine for such a fully-fledged account of the evolution of 
the preestablished harmony of perceptual similarity standards. After all, Quine (1974, 3) 
explicitly maintains that his project “may be pursued at one or more removes from the 
laboratory, one or another level of speculativity.” In this vein, he could respond that his 
invocations of natural selection do not have to satisfy fully-fledged scientific standards, since 
he operates on the more speculative level, where he sketches a new research perspective that 
may then be fleshed out by trained specialists.  
Hence, the interesting question is: is it plausible that it is possible for biologists to provide 
such a fully-fledged evolutionary-scientific account of the phenomenon in question? The 
phenomenon in question is the preestablished harmony of innate perceptual similarity 
standards, which is the cornerstone of Quine's account how genuine communication is 
possible at least on the level of holophrastic observation sentences. 
In the remainder of this section, I raise doubts regarding this possibility. My entire discussion 
is heavily indebted to Richardson (2007), who insists that some subject matters are well-
suited for evolutionary studies, while others are not: 
Fruit flies are a well-adapted subject for evolutionary studies. Likewise, as I 
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illustrated in the previous chapter, the morphology of Gammarus minus is one that is 
amenable to evolutionary analysis. But psychology, in contrast, is poorly adapted as 
an evolutionary science. (Richardson 2007, 148) 
Richardson here essentially claims that the methods that proved successful in the case of fruit 
flies and in the case of the morphology of Gammarus minus (a species of amphipod 
crustacean) are likely to be not equally successful when applied to psychology. The reason for 
this is that it is much more difficult to examine human psychology in a way that satisfies core 
methodological principles of evolutionary biology than it is to examine the morphology of 
Gammarus minus in such a way. As will become evident, this has much to do with the 
amount of evidence and information that is available about the morphology of Gammarus 
minus, but not with regard to human psychology. 
In the following, I introduce these elements, or pieces of information, that an ideal 
explanation in evolutionary biology requires, following Richardson (2007, 99–104; he 
himself refers to Brandon 1990, chap. 5). Richardson admits that an explanation by natural 
selection does not have to detail all of these pieces to pass muster; but they do give an idea of 
the "sort of criteria relevant to deciding whether an explanation passes muster" (Richardson 
2007, 99). There are five such elements. 
Selection. First, Richardson requires that “There must be evidence that selection has in fact 
occurred”. This in turn requires that we have information regarding the variation of the 
feature in question by the time the natural selection is postulated to have occurred, together 
with information about the differences in terms of survival and reproductive success that 
these different features have bestowed upon their bearers. 
Ecological Factors. Next, Richardson requires that we can explain said selection with 
recourse to ecological factors, that is, we need to be able to specify which properties of the 
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social or physical environment caused a certain trait to be conducive to its bearer’s 
reproductive and survival success. 
Heritability. For evolution through natural selection to be possible, the features that increase 
the reproductive fitness of their bearers must be heritable. This means, according to 
Richardson (ibid.), that phenotypical features should be correlated between parent and 
offspring to an extent that is clearly greater than mere chance. This requires that if the parent 
has a specific selective advantage, it should be more likely than not that the parent passes this 
advantage on to the offspring. 
Population Structure. The gist of this factor is that if there are different populations living in 
different habitats that furnish different biological features with a selective advantage, then a 
gene flow between these populations is likely to cancel out any selection due to the several 
different habitats. For instance, assume that there are two populations of fruit flies, one living 
by a pond, the other living in a swamp. The populations are sufficiently close to allow for 
frequent mating between members of the two populations. Furthermore, assume that large 
fruit flies living in the swamp have more offspring than small ones living in the swamp, while 
the converse holds for fruit flies living by the pool. In such a situation, the two selective 
pressures are likely to cancel each other out: there will be no significant increase or decrease 
in size of the fruit flies in either population across generations because of inter-population 
mating. 
In contrast, a completely isolated population in a uniform environment that exercises a 
consistent selective pressure on the population is more hospitable to evolution through natural 
selection. For instance, assume that there is just the one population living in the swamp, 
where larger flies have significantly more offspring. Then, there may occur a selection and an 
increase in size of individual flies across generations. 
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Trait Polarity. Richardson uses this condition to emphasize that there is a difference between 
a feature’s being adaptive and a feature’s being an adaptation. In particular, there can be 
adaptive features that are not adaptations. This is the case if a certain biological feature that is 
very useful, perhaps even indispensable for the life-form of a given species, is present in 
ancestral species already. Richardson (ibid.) mentions the skull sutures of mammal infants. 
Without them, mammalian birth would probably be impossible, so this feature is very 
adaptive. However, since it is present in birds and reptiles, it cannot possibly be an adaptation 
to said mammalian birth: the skull sutures existed well before mammalian birth evolved. 
To illustrate how these elements are included in state-of-the-art explanations by natural 
selection, Richardson (2007, 120–24) presents the case of Gammarus minus. This species of 
amphipod crustacean has specific adaptations for its habitat, dark caves in West Virginia. 
Individuals belonging to this species differ from their non-cave-inhabiting ancestors mainly 
in being larger, having drastically reduced eyes, and having larger antennae. The question to 
be answered in the following is whether these differences can be explained with recourse to 
natural selection. Regarding selection, it is easy to verify that there is variation of the trait: 
one can simply measure body and antenna size and count the eye facets of individuals living 
in the caves. Then, one can compare these numbers to the ones of their relatives that do not 
live in caves but rather near springs. 
Furthermore, in the habitat of Gammarus minus, which is completely dark, larger antenna are 
obviously conducive to survival. More precisely, concerning the ecological factors that drive 
the selection, Richardson (2007, 122–23) mentions that field studies in caves show that 
“individuals with smaller eyes, larger antennae, and larger body size mate more frequently 
and produce more offspring than those in the same population with larger eyes and smaller 
antennae and body size.” Regarding heritability, Richardson (2007, 123) introduces a 
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laboratory study that indicates that offspring of cave-dwelling Gammarus have smaller eyes 
than offspring of spring-dwelling Gammarus, with a correspondence that roughly matches the 
heritability of body height in humans. Concerning population structure, it has been verified 
that the different populations of Gammarus minus are very isolated and exposed to a very 
homogeneously light-less environment (Richardson 2007, 123–24). Trait polarity, finally, is 
very easily established, as the non-cave-dwelling Gammarus have substantially bigger eyes, 
but shorter bodies and antenna. 
Now, let us consider Quine’s explanation by natural selection of the preestablished harmony 
of humans’ innate perceptual similarity standards. Of the five pieces of information that 
Richardson requires from an ideal explanation by natural selection, Quine only touches upon 
two: selection and ecological factors. Concerning selection, he does not specify the variation 
of similarity standards between individuals, nor does he specify the time where the selection 
is supposed to have occurred. In terms of the ecological factors that have conferred a survival 
advantage on their bearers, Quine does not get more specific than “the grain of nature” or 
“natural trends”. There is no information on heritability, population structure, or on trait 
polarity. In short, it is obvious that Quine’s invocations of natural selection fall short of the 
standards employed by the science of evolutionary biology. 
However, as mentioned above, the interesting question is not whether Quine’s own 
invocations fulfill these standards, but rather whether it is possible that evolutionary 
biologists develop an account along Quine’s lines that fulfills these standards. There are good 
reasons to assume that this is not possible. Consider the five kinds of information that 
Richardson lists for an ideal explanation of a human trait by natural selection. Take as the 
trait in question the preestablished harmony of human perceptual similarity standards, which 
explains the possibility of communication. Skulls and bones cannot give us any information 
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regarding the variation of innate perceptual similarity standards, since they are behavioral not 
anatomical traits. Similarly, we have no clue as to the ecological factors that shaped these 
standards, or about the relevant population structure and the trait polarity. More importantly, 
it seems very unlikely that we will ever have such information available. 
Hence, while it is not impossible that, at some point, we will have all the information 
necessary for a proper evolutionary explanation to cash out Quine’s speculations, or, 
alternatively, that the methodological standards for such an explanation (perhaps due to vastly 
more reliable computer simulations) change drastically, it is doubtful whether there will be 
such an explanation. This means that it is doubtful whether Quine is able to explain why there 
is such a thing as successful communication, even on the level of holophrastic observation 
sentences. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have delineated the reasons that prompted Quine to abandon core elements of 
his empiricism and physicalism: the discovery that nerve endings are non-homologous lead 
Quine to abandon the notion of intersubjectively (almost) invariant stimulus meaning in 
favor, eventually, of a preestablished harmony of innate perceptual similarity standards. This 
preestablished harmony is accounted for by natural selection, and it ensures that two humans 
understand each other on the level of holophrastic observation sentences despite the 
incongruent empirical data that they receive in any given situation. 
Quine also enlists natural selection to explain the success of science. While, in Natural Kinds, 
Quine has considered the innate sense of perceptual similarity an obstacle to theoretical 
science, his mature position is that the success of science can be explained by appreciating 
that the similarity standards on which this science is ultimately based have been selected for 
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precisely such a success. 
In a critical assessment of these uses of natural selection, I have suggested that Quine is 
justified in the first use, whereas it is doubtful whether he succeeds in using natural selection 
to guarantee the preestablished harmony of innate perceptual similarity standards. This 
implies that it is unclear whether Quine can explain how genuine communication is so much 
as possible. 
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Footnotes 
1 Note that I am not claiming any close connections between physicalism as such and 
empiricism as such; one can defend the one without defending the other. 
2 I am here not referring to the indeterminacy of translation. The essential point here is that 
Quine cannot explain communication at a very basic level, a level that Quine did not want to 
be touched by any indeterminacy, namely the level of holophrastic observation sentences. As 
I detail on pages 4-5, Quine intended holophrastic observation sentences to furnish true 
intersubjectivity, almost entirely unaffected by indeterminacies. 
3 This leaves room for forms of communication (which one might or might not call 
languages) that lack any such grammatical or ontological structure. Observation sentences of 
these forms of communications could then only be used holophrastically. See Janssen-Lauret 
(2016, 149). 




word sentences that a child produces at an early stage of language learning. 
5Quine gives the final definition of stimulus meaning as follows: “a stimulus meaning is the 
stimulus meaning modulo n seconds of sentence S for speaker a at time 𝑡” (Quine 1960, 
33). The specification of the modulus and the time are required to avoid some technical 
problems. For my purposes, however, it is more expedient to focus on the first definition, 
as it is more straightforward. 
6Føllesdal (2014, 268) worries that taking sensory stimulations as basic semantic units of 
significance contradicts Quine’s behaviorism, since “they are not part of the publicly 
available evidence that is so crucial to behaviorism”. I think this worry can be met in the 
following way: just take the subject into a laboratory, where behaviorism is naturally at 
home, and wire it up such that the researchers can monitor all the activities on the subject’s 
nerve endings. This furnishes all the public availability that Quine’s behaviorism requires. 
This largely agrees with Johnsen (2014, 984), who argues that the stimulus meaning is not 
what any competent speaker means with a sentence, but what external researchers are able 
to determine as such. 
7There is surprisingly little research on Quine’s notion of quality space. Exceptions are 
Broughton (1981), who suspects that Quine’s notion is covertly mentalistic, and van 
Brakel (2000), who compares Quine’s notion to similar conceptions in cognitive science. 
8Note that the intentional vocabulary is here merely to facilitate presentation. The account to 
which Quine ultimately commits himself is phrased in terms of efficient causes, 
dispositions, stimuli, and conditioned responses. 
9In this context, ‘homology’ means having the same, or at least a very similar structure. 
Hence, the nerve endings of two humans are homologous if they have the same structure. 
This requires that their sensory surfaces are isomorphic. 
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This passage resounds in Pursuit of Truth, where Quine claims that he felt discomfort over 
the notion of sameness of stimulus meanings already in 1965, and he expresses his 
conviction that “anatomical minutiae” like homology of nerve endings should be irrelevant 
to his project, see Quine (1992, 40) and Quine (1992, 3–4). 
10Quine’s use of phrases such as the cosmic machine revealed by science (Quine 1969b, 133) 
is certainly notable. I discuss below (section 4.1), why the use of these metaphors does not 
imply that Quine defends anything close to contemporary scientific realism. Still, these 
phrases explain why naturalistic realists like Kornblith (2002) are particularly fond of 
Natural Kinds. 
11This has led Føllesdal (2014, 276) to claim that Quine’s position is surprisingly similar to 
Husserl’s. 
12The notion of a receptual neighborhood is intended to allow for perceptual similarity to 
operate on patterns of stimulations that are receptually similar, but not identical. 
13 In his "Progress on Two Fronts" (Quine 1996), Quine gives an account of the preestablished 
harmony of innate perceptual similarity standards, and of its significance for his theory of 
meaning and evidence, that is very similar to the one in From Stimulus to Science. 
14The vague expression “mesh pretty well with natural trends” is another Quinean attempt to 
say that evolution ensures that these standards have a certain epistemic validity, without 
committing himself to anything like scientific realism. Compare below, section 4.1. 
15 See also the very similar passages on Quine (1995/2016a, 31) as well as Quine 
(1995/2016b, 35). The passages show how central to Quine's thinking preestablished 
harmony was in this late stage of his publishing career.  
16 Compare the following passage from a letter by Quine to Gary Ebbs (Ebbs 2016, 28): "The 
one major departure from Word and Object in my later work, so far as I see, is renunciation 
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of intersubjective identity or similarity of stimulus meanings. Preestablished harmony of 
subjective standards of subjective perceptuality fills the bill." 
17Compare Gjelsvik (2014, 322), who also sees this change as a radical modification of 
Quine’s conception of evidence. 
18 See also Quine (1995/2016a, 29ff.), where Quine emphasizes publicly observable behavior 
at the cost of intersubjectively shared stimuli – and then gives an account of how 
preestablished harmony of innate perceptual similarity standards is needed to explain first-
language acquisition based on such publicly observable behavior. This nicely agrees with 
my position, according to which the preestablished harmony is needed to, as it were, 
compensate for the privacy of stimulus meanings. I take the following paragraph from said 
article (Quine 1995/2016a, 30f.) to express exactly this position: 
In Pursuit of Truth that appeal [to intersubjective similarity of stimulus 
meanings, RG] is out of order, so the causal question recurs: why, after the 
mother has got the child to affirm 'Milk' once in an appropriate situation, 
does the child's usage continue to agree with the mother's? The answer can 
lie no longer in intersubjective similarity of stimulus meaning. It now lies 
rather in an intersubjective parallelism of subjective scales of perceptual 
similarity [emphasis RG]. If A and B jointly witness two events, and A's 
neural intakes on the two occasions are perceptually similar by A's 
standards, then B's intakes will tend to be similar by B's. 
19Compare Devitt (1997, 14–22), Psillos (2009, 34), and Chakravartty (2017). 
